June 12 annulment: Babangida’s breathtaking cowardice demistifies him!
By Olu Fasan
Last week, I wrote that one column would not do justice to the significant issues General Ibrahim Babangida covers in his memoir, A Journey in Service. So, my focus was only on the events that led to the Civil War. This week, I want to tackle another subject: The Babangida regime’s annulment of the presidential election of June 12, 1993.
After the Civil War, the June 12 annulment is the next most epochal and seismic event in the annals of Nigeria since independence. Thus, once Babangida decided to write his memoir, it was inevitable that he would address the June 12 issue. And address it he did! In fact, he devotes a whole chapter – Chapter 12 (how eponymous!) – to the subject under the title “Transition to Civil Rule and the June 12 Saga”.
But having told the annulment story – or his version of the story – General Babangida must expect the verdict of history. Sadly, that verdict will be harsh, very harsh! Why? Because the story General Babangida tells in that book stretches credulity. For if the story is true, then it shatters the public image of Babangida that had endured for decades; it busts the myths, tarnishes the mystique, around him as a brave, fearless officer. The story is one of breathtaking cowardice, of the demythification of General Ibrahim Babangida!
Think about it. General Babangida was a famed military strategist, an aficionado of military intelligence. In the book’s chapter on the Civil War, Babangida said he “led attacks and executed offensive and defensive manoeuvres”, saying his operative words were “to lead”, adding: “No officer who lacked courage or conviction could be effective in the situation before us.” Later on, after the war, Babangida had a reputation as a veteran of many successful coup d’états, who also foiled coups, and for his ruthlessness in dealing with colleagues, such as General Mamman Vasta, his “childhood friend”, who drew his ire. What’s more, Babangida was known as “Maradona” and “Evil Genuis”, notorious sobriquets he gleefully relished.
Yet, all the above attributes and character traits – courage, conviction, decisive leadership, military intelligence and strategy – deserted General Babangida when faced with the June 12 situation. He gave the impression, in his own narrative, that he was outsmarted, outmanoeuvred, defied and rendered utterly helpless by others; that he was wrapped around some fingers and manipulated as a mere puppet!
Take the most unthinkable. General Babangida said that then-Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Clement Akpamgbo, supported a dubious court injunction to stop the election “in clear violation of Decree 13, which barred any court from interfering with NEC’s conduct or scheduling of the elections”. He said that then-NEC chairman, Professor Humphrey Nwosu, announced the suspension of the June 12 election results “without my knowledge or prior approval”. Then, he said it “took a long time” to figure out the real forces behind the oxymoronically-named “Association for Better Nigeria, ABN”, which campaigned for the extension of military rule, even though everyone knew the group was led and funded by the maverick billionaire Arthur Nzeribe, who Babangida admitted was his friend.
How, one must ask, could the above happen to the “legendary” General Babangida? How could those “bloody civilians” so blatantly dare him? It is either Akpamgbo, Nwosu and Nzeribe acted with Babangida’s tacit support, in which case he was complicit and duplicitous, or they truly acted entirely without his knowledge, in which case he was utterly weak and rudderless, a caricature of his famed reputation. Many would opt for the former: he tacitly supported those he called “fifth columnists”.
But it was at the feet of his military colleagues that Babangida lay the blame for the June 12 annulment. Babangida wrote: “One of my biggest mistakes was failing to firmly secure the support and firm commitment of my military colleagues to the Transition programme from the beginning,” adding that he “completely underestimated the deep opposition to civil rule within the military’s top hierarchy”. Yet, since Babangida announced the timetable for the transition to civil rule in July 1987, every major decision, such as the establishment of the NEC and the two political parties and the conduct of local, state and federal elections, except the presidential poll, was approved by the Armed Forces Ruling Council, AFRC, and, later, the National Defence and Security Council, NDSC. How, then, could he say the military’s top hierarchy did not support the return to civil rule “from the beginning”. And if his military colleagues were opposed to the “transition” programme, was he himself honest about it?
When General Theophilus Danjuma questioned the integrity of the “transition” programme and General Olusegun Obasanjo described it as “silly experiments and gimmicks”, Babangida protested, saying: “As decorated officers like them, our honour meant a lot to us.” Yet, with the annulment, it turned out that their honour meant nothing to them. However, Babangida said the annulment was not his original idea or decision. For several years, Babangida denied that his military colleagues held a gun to his head and forced him to annul the election. But that narrative changed dramatically in his memoir!
General Babangida said that, on the morning of June 23, 1993, he went to Katsina to commiserate with the Yar’Adua family over the death of their patriarch, adding: “As I got ready to leave, a report filtered to me that the June 12 elections had been annulled.” Isn’t that beyond belief? How could a presidential election be annulled extrajudicially without the prior knowledge of the head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces? If true, it was effectively a coup, rendering Babangida powerless. But who was behind it? Babangida said: “I would later find out that the ‘forces’ led by General Sani Abacha annulled the elections.” But did he confront Abacha? No, he was too afraid! Rather, on June 26, in a national broadcast, Babangida formally annulled the election, citing grounds he admits in his memoir were “tepid and disingenuous”. Truth is, whatever reasons Babangida gives in the book for his decisions, he acted utterly cowardly.
Even worse, Abacha is not alive to defend himself. Yet, as General Ishola Williams, the Army’s former head of operations, recently said on Channels TV, it would seem that Babangida had a power transfer deal with Abacha, who he often called “caubar” or “my successor”. General Williams said he asked Babangida: “Do you have a deal with Abacha that he would succeed you?” He said Babangida could not answer the question!
General Babangida seemingly has not told the whole truth about the inside, behind-the-scenes story of the June 12 annulment. Aspects of his narrative look like cunningly devised fables. Sadly, the narrative demythifies him!
Vanguard Media Limited