Trump’s New Tariff Regime and Nigeria’s Opportunity to Rewrite the Trade Script

By Dr. Tope Fasoranti

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has brought more than political theatre—it has revived the choreography of tariffs, trade shocks, and economic nationalism. A new 14% tariff imposed on most Nigerian exports (excluding oil and gas) is only the latest salvo in what may be a more protracted and selective global trade war. While Washington’s sights are largely set on China and the European Union, the fallout for countries like Nigeria could be just as enduring—and potentially transformational.

This is not the first time Nigeria finds itself on the receiving end of shifting trade currents. Nor is it the first time U.S. policy decisions have exposed structural vulnerabilities in the Nigerian economy. But what distinguishes the current moment is the clarity it offers. This is not merely a challenge to be managed. It is an opportunity to be seized.

For decades, Nigeria’s trade relationship with the United States has rested on the scaffolding of preferential treatment. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which was enacted in 2000, opened U.S. markets to African exports—mostly duty-free—but has yielded mixed results. While Kenya, Lesotho, and Ethiopia have turned apparel and light manufacturing into viable export sectors, Nigeria has struggled. The underutilisation of AGOA has less to do with the framework itself and more to do with the country’s domestic constraints: poor infrastructure, high logistics costs, regulatory red tape, and an anaemic industrial base.

Instead of building a diversified export profile, Nigeria has leaned on its oil reserves. The result is a lopsided trade relationship: the U.S. imports Nigerian crude; Nigeria imports American machinery, vehicles, and refined goods. The introduction of tariffs on non-oil exports, therefore, strikes at a part of the economy that is small in volume but large in potential. Agriculture, textiles, leather, and light manufacturing—sectors long identified as diversification priorities—now face fresh external headwinds. But they also present the clearest path to self-correction.

Nigeria’s reliance on externally dictated terms of trade, particularly those based on goodwill and exception rather than competitiveness, is increasingly untenable. Global trade is shifting towards bilateralism with a transactional edge. Preferences are giving way to terms negotiated in hard-nosed interest. In such a world, strength is measured not by the generosity of one’s partners but by the readiness of one’s economy.

The prevailing trade model—exporting raw materials and importing finished goods—is a relic of a colonial past. Cocoa is exported and re-imported as chocolate. Cashew nuts are shipped raw and returned as branded snacks. The country captures little value and exports even less complexity. Reversing this pattern demands a reorientation around light manufacturing, especially in sectors suited to Nigeria’s demographic profile and resource base.

Garments, footwear, furniture, and agro-processing are not glamorous but are labour-intensive, low-capital, and proven contributors to export growth. They also have the virtue of being scalable in a resource-constrained setting. But talk of industrialisation without action is merely ritual. Nigeria must confront and overcome its longstanding structural bottlenecks. These include an unreliable power grid, chronic infrastructure deficits, policy incoherence, and an often hostile regulatory environment. Investors, domestic and foreign alike, are not looking for perfection. They are looking for predictability.

Trade institutions must also evolve. Agencies responsible for export promotion and trade negotiations require adequate funding, technical depth, and political backing. Trade policy cannot remain an orphaned subset of foreign affairs. It must be central to Nigeria’s economic planning, not merely its international protocol.

Nigeria’s domestic market, often cited as an advantage, remains underutilised in industrial policy. Public procurement is a powerful tool for building local capacity. Government can create predictable demand for uniforms, office furniture, school supplies, and IT components—provided local producers meet quality standards. A public campaign to buy Nigerian products will only succeed if they can hold their own in an open market.

If Nigeria is serious about escaping the commodity trap, it must also look beyond bilateral ties with the West. Regional integration offers a more sustainable route to competitiveness. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Nigeria’s leadership role within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) present untapped opportunities. Regional markets offer scale, proximity, and cultural familiarity—advantages not easily replicated in transatlantic trade.

Yet progress has been underwhelming. Poor enforcement of trade protocols, non-tariff barriers, and inadequate transport corridors continue to stymie intra-African trade. The Lagos–Abidjan corridor remains riddled with inefficiencies. The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme, if fully implemented, could unlock immediate value for Nigerian SMEs. However, such outcomes require deliberate investment in customs digitisation, border infrastructure, and product standard harmonisation. Nigeria must stop treating regional trade as a footnote and start treating it as a strategic pillar.

Nor should Nigeria ignore the reordering of global supply chains. As geopolitical tensions reshape sourcing decisions, there is an opportunity for countries with competitive labour and improving infrastructure to insert themselves into new production networks. Nigeria can become a credible manufacturing base—not for the world, perhaps, but for a continent increasingly willing to buy what it used to import. But this will not happen by default. It requires reforms in logistics, tax administration, and dispute resolution. It requires, above all, a clear and stable policy environment.

There are examples worth emulating. South Korea and Taiwan built industrial strength not through slogans but through execution. More recently, countries like Rwanda and Ethiopia have shown that investor confidence can be built with stability, transparency, and clear rules of engagement. Nigeria, with its size and resources, does not need to follow any model slavishly. But it must choose a direction.

The new tariff regime comes at a moment of macroeconomic fragility. Inflation is high, and public finances are stretched. Yet paradoxically, these very constraints can create the political justification for reform. Policymakers need not wait for perfect conditions. They need only begin. Strategically, incrementally, and with consistency.

The 90-day pause announced by the U.S. administration should not be mistaken for a reprieve. It is a deadline. A brief window in which Nigeria must clarify its position, accelerate reforms, and engage its trade partners from a place of seriousness rather than sentiment. There is no room for nostalgia. There is only room for strategy.

Trade is no longer about exports alone. It is about resilience, competitiveness, and national survival. Nigeria can no longer afford to be the grass that suffers when the elephants fight. It must stop being the grass altogether—and become, if not an elephant, then a creature capable of holding its ground.

Dr. Tope Fasoranti is an economist, banker, and consultant on digital transformation

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